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OperatingMethods and Collection
Experience
CONTROL of credit risk in the personal finance business pre-
sents special aspects intrinsic to the nature of such lending,
geared in each case, as it must be, to the extension and ad-
ministration of hundreds and even thousands of small loans.
Under these conditions, credit granting must proceed speed-
ily, accurately and at low cost, necessitating procedures and
standards that are highly routinized yet acutely sensitive to
dubious risks. The loss from slow collection or ultimate
charge-off on a single small loan is not an imposing sum, but
successful operation requires that better than ninety-five out
of every hundred loans consistently pay out, and that de-
linquency, a vital element of collection cost, be held within
tolerable limits. Not only must credit granting proceed
swiftly and effectively, but business continuity requires that
a steady flow of loan demand be maintained. Since profitabil-
ity of operations tends to increase (up to a certain point)
with loan volume, every loan office must continuously strive
to increase the number of customers it serves.
METHODS OF OBTAINING BUSINESS
Students of credit retailing have frequently pointed out that
in the personal small loan business the longer a lender can
keep his money in the hands of the same group of borrowers
the larger his profits will be. When there are no special
credit-granting and investigating fees, customer turnover in-
creases costs of investigation and adds nothing to revenue.
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On the other hand, lengthening the period of customer in-
debtedness, either by longer contracts or by successive loans
to the same borrowers, increases risk. Extended repayments
weaken the morale of borrowers, and the favorable situation
with respect to income and stability of home conditions that
obtained at the time of the original investigation may be-
come increasingly uncertain as time passes. In seeking maxi-
mum revenue, lenders necessarily strive to maintain a loan
portfolio in which these cost and risk factors are counter-
balanced.
With these considerations in mind, lenders actively solicit
loan applications from former customers, and draw about
of their applicants from this group. Such applica-
tions are readily granted if past loans have been repaid; three-
fourths or more of them, according to the experience of two
chain companies, are accepted. Also, present borrowers are
actively encouraged to apply for additional sums; such re-
quests typically amount to more than half of all loan ap-
plications, and they are granted, when payments on outstand-
ing balances are up to date, in more than nine out of ten
cases. The lender cultivates these borrower groups because
a given volume of loans to them costs less than the same
volume to new borrowers.
The importance of past and present borrower groups as
a source of loan demand does not, of course, free lenders
from the necessity of finding new customers to sustain and
swell their loan volume. Nearly half of all loan applications
come from new customers, though only about a third to a
half of their applications are granted. Office location and
advertising are important factors in attracting new borrowers.
At one time loan company offices were on the second floor
and had painted windows, and the result was the encourage-
ment of furtive borrowing. The business is now conducted
with entire openness, though loan companies still retain
private consultation rooms where prospective borrowers may68 PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
discuss their circumstances with the manager. without fear of
being overheard by clerks or other applicants. In former years
the surreptitious character of the business made it impossible
to develop an aggressive advertising program,' but after
operations were legalized and the personal finance company
became a recognized financial institution, advertising meth-
ods came to duplicate those used in any other business. News-
papers, periodicals, radio, mail circulars, theater and bill-
board advertising, bus, train and streetcar posters, have all
been utilized to communicate with potential borrowers, and
have helped to establish the present market for small loans.
Other promotional devices to attract new customers in-
clude the granting of special rates for preferred risks, and
the use of unsecured notes. To attract schoolteacher borrow-
ers, for example, some companies offer them lower rates
than those offered borrowers in other occupations, the se-
curity of schoolteacher income providing the greater safety
which justifies the lower charge. Lower rates are sometimes
offered on larger loans in order to attract borrowers from
the higher income brackets, for there is a direct correlation
between income of borrower and size of loan. One large
chain company, as mentioned in Chapter 2, has established
over the past few years a number of offices making only un-
secured loans, an appeal to customers who do not care to
pledge household chattels as loan security.
Finally, in. to cultivate community goodwill, lenders
consider it effective promotion to furnish a budget service to
their customers. Loan men are taught how to prepare budg-
ets for families of given size, income and tastes. Sometimes
loans are granted only on condition that the borrower adhere
to the budget worked out for him, and occasionally the bor-
rower receives his loan not in cash but in one Or more checks
payable to creditors. Not infrequently the loan company,
1Newspaperadvertising was used to some extent even in the loan-shark era,
however; see L. N. Robinson and Roll Nugent, Regulation of the Small Loan
Business (1935) pp. 37-42.OPERATION AND COLLECTION
with the borrower's permission, approaches creditors in an
effort to persuade them to accept partial payment in full
settlement of their claims. At least one chain company has
urged borrowers, upon completion of their payments, to
continue setting aside each month, as savings, an amount
equal to their monthly instalments. In some cases loan com-
panies have acted as employment agencies. It has become cus-
tomary in the business for lenders to view themselves as
consultants in family finance, with the object of fostering
community goodwill and a wider familiarity with their credit
facilities.
Although most small loan borrowers intend to meet their
obligations, they are as a group particularly subject to unex-
pected loss of employment, and when this occurs they may
find it impossible to.repay in accordance with the terms of
the contract. Lenders therefore find it highly important to
pursue a policy of diversification, in order to limit the num-
ber of borrowers likely to be affected by the shutdown of a
particular factory or the decline of a particular industry.
The two principal bases of diversification are occupation
and geographic location. They are not, of course, mutually
exclUsive: the need to spread operations over many com-
munities results partly from the dependence of certain local-
ities on one or two industries—the concentration of automo-
bile manufacturing in Detroit, for example—and partly'
from the circumstance that an industry may be flourishing
in one part of the country and stagnant in another.
The necessity for occupational and geographic diversifica-
tion as a means of spreading risk has accelerated the chain
lenders' extensive market expansion in recent years. The
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, in citing the extent
of its operations, has stated that "the wide geographical and
industrial diversification thus obtained, in addition to the
essential character of the business, minimizes adverse effects
of business depressions upon the operations and profits of the70 PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
Company."2 The stabilityof the earnings of large chain lend-
ers during the depression of 1929-33 emphasizes the wisdom
of widely distributing risks.3 Independent offices and very
small chain lenders are able to achieve some diversification,
but they lack the advantages of a wide territorial distribution
of business.
OFFICE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE
A licensed office usually requires at least three people to con-
duct all essential activities: a manager, an "outside" man and
a clerk. The manager interviews applicants, decides on all
applications and is in charge of the office. The outside man
investigates applicants, undertakes to collect long-delinquent
accounts and institutes a search for borrowers who have dis-
appeared. The clerk receives and records payments, and usu-
ally does all the bookkeeping as well as the secretarial work
of the office. It is estimated that a staff of three can admin-
ister effectively about 750 loans at a time, representing out-
standings of $70,000 to $100,000. Independent licensed offices
• may operate on the basis of a substantially lower loan balance,
but if a chain office is not able to maintain an average of more
than $50,000 outstandings, with good prospects for expansion,
the staff will probably be reduced or the office transferred to
another community where the time of employees can be
utilized more fully.4 Larger offices require an assistant man-
ager and an additional number of outside men and clerks, the
total number depending upon the volume of business and the
quality of personnel. Chain offices are controlled through a
system of supervisors, each in charge of six to twelve offices
that he visits at least once a month.5
The rise of chain lending has necessitated the development
2Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, Annual Report for 1929.
For the two largest chain lenders the ratios of net income to total assets
were 11.2 and 9.3 in 1929. In 1933 the ratio was 8.9 for both companies.
4Robinson and Nugent, op. cit., pp. 203-04.
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of centralized methods of control, the training of a staff along
uniform lines being especially imperative. To this end the
larger chains have found it advantageous to establish courses
of instruction for employees, the best known of which is the
two-year correspondence course of the Industrial Lenders
Technical Institute, operated by the Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corporation. For several years the company made the
course available not merely to its employees, who were re.
quired to take it, but to anyone connected with the industry,
and reports state that at one time 1,200 outside persons were
enrolled. The Household Finance Corporation also has an
extensive training, course for its own employees, developed
with the aid of Northwestern University; it includes manuals,
written tests and lectures illustrated with_s ..i.d-slipictures.
The applicant for a cash loan is interviewed privately by
the manager of the loan office or one of his assistants, and an-/
swersstandardized auestions for an application form which
....,, .
themanager usually fills out—Heitates the purpose of
ing, gives an account of his financial condition and makes a
tentative estimate of his ability to repay within a siated period.
During this confidential interview the manager must deter-
mine whether the applicant appears to be a good credit risk;
in some cases the applicant's statements or manner call for an
immediate refusal of the loan.
All applications not patently ineligible for loan considera-
tion are investigated. The stated facts are checked by the out-
side man, who visits the home of the applicant, estimates his
financial responsibility and reviews the household budget,
paying particular attention to the amount of debt to which
the family is already committed. The investigator also evalu-
ates those intangible factors that indicate the extent to which
the home is stable and well managed. Unless the applicant
can show a file of receipted bills his financial responsibility
is investigated among the tradespeople in his neighborhood,
the investigator sometimes posing as the representative of a72 PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
mythical credit bureau or life insurance company. This prac-
tice, though considered justified in some cases, is generally
frowned upon. by lenders as unethica', since the private or
confidential character of the borrowing transaction is strongly
emphasized in advertising. The lender may consult a credit
exchange, retail credit bureau, legal files of debt judgments
or competing lenders. As a rule, small loan companies have
been opposed to joining established retail credit bureaus,
preferring to organize their own6 because of the emphasis they
place on a confidential relationship with borrowers. Some-
times such bureaus in different cities cooperate in order to
reduce duplicate borrowing and the evasion of obligations by
customers.
Investigation of former and present borrower applicants is
facilitated' by offices files, which record previous investigations
and past payment performance. As has already been stressed,
such borrowers are much more successful than new applicants
in obtaining credit. Table 16, presenting the records of
chain lenders over a several-year period, shows that one com-
pany granted loans to only one-third of all new applicants,
the other company to somewhat more than one-half. Former
borrowers fared much better, 78 and 87 percent of them hav-
ing their applications approved by the two companies respec-
tively. While the general trend of these proportions is sig-
nificant, no special importance should be attached to the
differences between the two companies, because they may vary
in their loan policies and also may follow different principles
in classifying their loan applications. Both companies ap-
proved about 95 percent of present borrowers' applications.
Supplementary information from the Household Finance
Corporation indicates that in this period 14 percent of all
applicants were refused immediately, without investigation,
and that such refusals were approximately 40 percent of all
6Fora list of these bureaus see American Association of Personal Finance
Companies, Roster of Personal Finance Companies (1938).OPERATION AND COLLECTION 73
TABLE 16
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND OF LOANS
































New 1,634,710149,650 543,291 85,664 33.2 57.2
Former 389,36324,921 303,373 21,740 77.9 87.2.
Present 1,508,621127,9211,421,506121,874 94.2 95.3
TOTAL3,532,694302,4922,268,170229,278 64.2 75.9
a Based on data supplied by the two companies. Applicants not receiving loans
include those who decided not to borrow at all, or to borrow elsewhere.
rejections. Outright rejections were relatively fewer in the
depression period of 1932-34 than in subsequent years.
COLLECTION PROCEDURE AND EXPERIENCE
Borrowers are required to mail or bring payments to the loan
office each month, and collection procedure is set in motion if
payments are not made when due. A routine has been estab-
lished whereby a series of form letters is mailed to delinquent,
borrowers; if the first few letters fail to bring results an in-
vestigator is sent to ascertain the cause of the delinquency
and to bring pressure to bear for payment.7 The collection
problem in personal finance starts with delinquency and ends
with refinancing, foreclosure or final charge-off.
Delinquency8
Much so-called delinquency is merely technical, as in the case
of borrowers who on the last day of the month mail checks
See Robinson and Nugent,op. cit., pp. 211.12.
8See also "Charge-off of Bad Debts," pp. 78 if.74 PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
TABLE 17
DELINQUENCYPERCENTAGES ON SMALL LOAN ACCOUNTS
DELINQUENT ONE MONTH OR MORE ON BOTH PRINCIPAL









Connecticutb 4.35 1.16 7.63 13.14
Florida 0 4.08 1.20 4.09 9.37
Illinois 5.90 1.45 2.81 10.16
Indiana 6.59 1.89 3.49 11.97
Iowa 6.98 1.66 2.21 10.85
Kentucky 7.49 1.86 3.18 12.53
Mainec 3.00 .74 1.38 5.12




1 .05 3.91 9. 83
Michigan 1.42 1.73 8.78
Missouri 5.55 1.41 2.30 9.26
New York 3.99 .83 1.46 6.28
Ohio 3.77 1.42 2.26 7.45
Virginia 5.60 2.30 6.50 14.40
Wisconsin 2.20 .54 .66 3.40
Based on annual reports of state banking departments. Figures are as of
December 31, 1937, unless otherwise indicated. Delinquency percentage repre-
sents the unpaid principal on all delinquent accounts expressed as a percent
of the unpaid principal on all outstanding accounts.
bSeptember30, 1937.
°Septembër 30, 1936.
that arrive a day or two late. One estimate9 places delin-
quency at 15 percent—measured, as is customary in the busi-
ness, as the ratio of unpaid principall on all delinquent
accounts to the unpaid principal on all outstanding accounts;
but this estimate includes accounts delinquent on principal
alone, as well as those delinquent on both principal and
jharges. Only the latter type of delinquency is included in the
annual reports made by licensees to state supervisors. Table
17 shows this delinquency in a of states as of the end
of 1937 (in Florida and Maine, September 30, 1936). In some
9Robinson and Nugent, op. cit., pp. 211-12.OPERATION AND COLLECTION 75
states such delinquency approaches the estimated 15 percent
total delinquency.
In order to eliminate technical delinquency the Household
Finance Corporation now classifies as delinquent only those
accounts which at the end of the month have had no payments
made on them since the nineteenth day of the preceding
month, thus an average period of grace of about
twelve days after the nominal due date. Mainly because of this
change in definition, but also because of a healthier condition
of accounts, average delinquency declined from about 15 per-
cent during 1929-34 to about 5 percent in 1935 and subse-
quent years. This change in the method of measuring delin-
quency has affected chiefly the figures for "delinquency on
both principal and charges," which, declined from 7.44 per-
cent in 1934 to 1.83 percent in 1937; "delinquency on prin-
cipal alone" was less than half the other type until 1932, but
is now about twice as large.
Analysis reveals that, on the average, loans to schoolteachers
fall into delinquency three times as often as those secured by
household goods or automobiles, or the unsecured notes of
others than schoolteachers. Practically all of this delinquency
on teacher loans is concentrated in the summer months, and
is sufficient to introduce a very pronounced seasonal move-
ment into the picture of total delinquency. Yet delinquency
on these loans rarely leads to loss of principal. It occurs
largely because teachers are not paid during the summer, and
because many travel or are otherwise away from home. While
such delinquency is real and inconveniences the lender, it
differs radically from the type of delinquency that produces
collection expense and possible charge-off.
Technical delinquency and delinquency on loans to school-
teachers thus give rise to an overstatement of true delin-
quency, but on the other hand there are "hidden slows"—
accounts that have made only partial payment on principal
but are not counted delinquent.76 PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
Refinancing
Refinancing occurs borrowers cannot meet payments
due -or when they seek additional funds before an existing
loan is paid off. In the first case, preceded usually by a period
of delinquency, the lender gains more by adjusting the terms
of payment than by attempting to enforce immediate collec-
tion of the entire unpaid balance, even though the latter is
legally due in full as soon as an account delinquent.
In the second case the adjustment is made at the borrower's
request and is an accommodation to him. A loan refinanced
without additional funds is termed by lenders a "straight re-
newal"; one entailing new credit is a "loan to a present
borrower."
When a loan is refinanced an entirely new contract is
drawn, usually with the same te'rms of payment as the orig-
inal. In straight renewals, assuming that at least one payment
has been made before renewal,-the effect of refinancing is of
course to reduce the size of the monthly payment.'° Renewal
loans are comparatively rare; in the business of one lender
they amount to less than 1 percent of all loans made. the
other hand, the refinancing of loans to present borrowers in
order to provide them with additional funds is of considerable
importance; in the business of two chain lenders such loans
amount to moke than 60 percent of all loans made.
Foreclosure
Ifthe lender holds a chattel mortgage on property of the
borrower, delinquency may lead to foreclosure. Although fre- -
quentlythreatened, actual foreclosures are fewer than might
be expected. be- seen-1 able.
-
by=borrewers occü frequently
10Ordinarily,but not always. A new contract might be drawn to run for a



























Kentucky .06 .13 .05 .24$ 6,100 26.1
Massachusettsd .01 .15 .01 .17 28,735 66.7
Michigan 0 .20 .08 .28 63,531 61.6
Nebraskao .24 .43 .05 .72 40,938 52.2
Virginia .02 .05 .05 .12 6,304 30.5
a Basedon annual reports of state banldng departments, for calendar year 1936
unless otherwise specified.
bAmountdue at time of foreclosure in percent of total loan balances out-
standing at end of year. A more useful ratio would be one based not on total
outstanding loans but on outstanding loans secured by chattel mortgages on
furniture. This is possible only for Michigan, and there the understatement
caused by using total outstandings amounts to 51 percent. For Kentucky,
Massachusetts and Virginia the closest approximation to outstanding loans se-
cured by chattel mortgages on furniture is outstanding chattel mortgage loans
in general, and if data on these loans arc used as a basis the figures in the table
are found to represent understatements of 31, 31 and 90 percent respectively.
oFurnituretaken when not in use is either abandoned or released by owner.
d Year ending September 30, 1936.
Data for 1937.
Less than 0.005 percent.
than the lenders neces-
sity for maintaining community goodwill makes foreclosure
a hazardous policy, and the low resale value of used furniture
and household goods also causes the lender to avoid fore-.
closure wherever possible. In regard to the latter point, Table
18 shows thaE the ratio of amount realized on recovered chat-
tels to amount due on unpaid balances ranged from 26 to 67
percent. Deficiency judgments for the balanëe are of little
practical value, and therefore are seldom obtained.
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TABLE 18 .
AMOUNTDUE AT TIME OF FORECLOSURE ON CHATTEL
MORTGAGES AND BILLS OF SALE, AND AMOUNT REALIZED,
IN SELECTED STATES, l936a
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of Bad Debts
The practice. followed in charging off loans as losses varies
widely among lenders. Loans charged off as losses are typically
those on which a resumption of principal payments is not
expected, but lenders often err in judging loans as losses and
subsequently recover all or part of the amount charged off.
The usual test of loss is the period of time during which pay-
ments have been delinquent, though loans not delinquent are
charged off in some cases because a change in the borrower's
status definitely presages a long interruption or a complete
breakdown of principal payments. To illustrate charge-off
practices and experience we rely mainly on data furnished by
the Household Finance Corporation, acknowledging that its
methods of operation may differ in some respects from those
of other lenders.
Although charged-off accounts are not necessarily delin-
quent, and although delinquent accounts are not always
charged off, it is reasonable to expect a significant degree of
relationship between delinquency and charge-offs. This rela-
tionship cannot be measured directly from available data, but
it is possible, as an approximation, to relate delinquency to
"bad-debt loss." In any given year the latter is obtained by
subtracting from total charge-offs the amount recovered in
that year. This method does not accurately state the loss for
that year, however, since there may be a lag between charge-
off and recovery, the two not necessarily occurring in the same
year.
Table 19 presents figures on delinquency and bad-debt
losses experienced by the Household Finance Corporation
and the American Investment Company of Illinois. Since the
two companies use different definitions of delinquency their
respective data are not comparable.
The year-to-year movements of the delinquency and bad-
debt figures for the Household Finance Corporation are
sufficiently alike, notwithstanding the discrepancies men-OPERATION AND COLLECTION 79
TABLE19
LOAN DELINQUENCY AND BAD-DEBT LOSS OF 2 PERSONAL
FINANCE CHAINS, 1923-37, IN PERCENT OF MONTHLY
LOAN ACCOUNTa
Tear
Loan Delinquency b Bad-Debt 0









1923 6.13 ... .59 •••
1924 6.38 •.. .80 ...
1925 6.58 .86 ...
1926 6.84 ... .90 ...
1927 7.02° ... .86 ...
1928 1O.68e 1.50 ...
1929 9.22 .•. 1.58 2.14
1930 10.48 11.45k 1.81 1.51
1931 13.55 2.21 1.76
1932 19.43 17.86k 5.39 3.11
1933 21.08 6.18 3.16
1934 13.41 13.52k 4.13 4.17
1935 1.24 2.26
1936 8.46 —.83 1.36
1937 1O.28e 9.91 .37 1.52
a Based on data supplied by the two companies. For the American Investment
Company data are not available for the earlier years of the period.
b Twelve-month average.
0Annualfigure.
dAnaccount is considered one month delinquent on the first day of the first
month following a due date on which full payment of charges and of principal
was not received. Thus accounts not paying full charges and principal, or pay-
ing charges only, or charges and part of principal, all become one month
delinquent on the first of the following month. An account is classified as two
months delinquent on the first day of the second month following the lapsed
payment. This method hides a certain amount of delinquency, on the average
about 15 days, but actual delinquency is overstated when it is registered. For
example, a payment due on May 15, if not paid, is not registered as delinquent
until June 1, but at that time it is called one month delinquent.
a Before 1928 figures are for delinquency on principal and charges. In 1928
and all subsequent years the figures include delinquency on principal alone as
well as on principal and charges. In 1928 average delinquency on principal
alone was 2.99 percent of average loan account.
I No automobile loans included.
In 1935 the Household Finance Corporation changed its method of measuring•8o PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
tioned above, to indicate a rather close connection between
delinquency and charge-off. In twelve of the fourteen year-to-.
year changes both series move in the same direction, and a
computation of link relatives1' for both series shows that in
seven of the fourteen changes the degrees of change are almost
identical; the 1925-26 link relative, for example, is 1.040 for
delinquency and 1.047 for bad-debt loss. When the figure on
bad-debt loss for any given year is compared with the figure
on delinquency for the preceding year—thus allowing for a
one-year lag between delinquency and charge-off—the cor-
relation of year-to-year change is definitely weakened. This
indicates that the period between delinquency and charge-off
is not very great.
The delinquency and bad-debt figures for the American
Investment Company move in the same direction in six of
the seven times for which data are available. A comparison of
the link relatives shows that the degrees of change are closely
similar for two years, very dissimilar for one year and fairly
close for four years. For the American Investment Company,
as for the Household Finance Corporation, a comparison of
the bad-debt figure for any given year with the delinquency
figure for the preceding year shows the correlation of year-to-
year change to be much less close.
Data on the length of delinquency prior to charge-off are
shown for the Household Finance Corporation in Tables 20
and 21. In Table 20 delinquency is classified according to the
usual practice of measuring it from the last date on which
some payment was received, either on principal and charges
11Linkrelatives are derived by dividing the figure for any one year by that
of the preceding year.
delinquency. Formerly all accounts which failed to make any payment during
the month were considered to be delinquent. Under the present method de-
linquent accounts are all those on which, at the end of the month, no payment
has been received since the nineteenth day of the preceding month. In the
interests of comparability the figures for 1935—37 have been adjusted upward
according to a formula supplied by the company. The unadjusted ratios re-
ported for these years are 5.35, 4.31 and 4.79.OPERATION AND COLLECTION 8i
TABLE 20
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS
CHARGED OFF BY A PERSONAL FINANCE CHAIN, 1935—37,













Not delinquent 23.9 19.5 16.8 12.3 11.1
Delinquent on principal
only, 40 days or more15.5 12.9 12.1 10.8 10.3
Delinquent on charges
and principal
40—59 days 20.9 17.3 ,16.9 16.3 18.3
60—B9days 11.0 16.0 13.9 17.3 17.4
90 days ormore 28.8 34.3 40.3 43.3 • 42.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Basedon datasupplied by the Household Finance Corporation. Delinquency
ismeasured from the last date on which some payment was received, either
on principal and charges or on charges alone.
TABLE 21
PERCENTAGEDISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS
CHARGED OFF BY A PERSONAL FINANCE CHAIN, 1935—3 7,












I or less 12.3 12.2 9.2 7.8 7.0
2— 4 30.7 32.7 30.5 33.0 .33.8
5— 7 26.3 26.8 32.4 31.7 34.0
8—10 10.6 13.3 11.9 16.1 15.5
11—13 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.3 5.6
14—16 3.3 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.0
17—19 2.1 1.2 1.8 1.1 .7
20ormore 9.6 5.6 5.8 2.7 1.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Based on data supplied by the Household Finance Corporation. Delinquency
is measured from date of last payment of charges plus at least half of the instal-
ment due on principal.82 PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
or on charges alone. For example, if the last payment was
made more than 40 days prior to charge-off, and covered
charges but nothing on principal, the charged-off account is
included among those "delinquent on principal only, 40 days
or more."2 If nothing had been paid on the account, either
on principal or on charges, for more than 40 days but less
than 60 days, it is classified as "delinquent on charges and
principal, 40-59 days." If the account paid charges and at least
something on principal within 40 days prior to charge-off it
is classified as "not delinquent." It should be pointed out that
this classification overstates the period of actual delinquency,
since it measures from the date of the last payment made
rather than from the date on which the subsequent payment
was due. The terminology of the trade is used here, but it
is important to bear in mind that an overstatement is in-
volved.
According to Table 20 more than 40 percent of all accounts
charged off in 1937 were delinquent 90 days or more on both
principal and charges at the time of charge-off, and about 35
percent were delinquent 40-90 days. About 10 percent of all
loans charged off delinquent on principal only, and
another 10 percent were not delinquent at all.
It is reasonable that asubstantialproportion of charged-off
accounts should show a delinquency of 90 days or more, for
lenders will delay charge-off as long as they can afford to keep
delinquent accounts on their books. The fact that accounts
delinquent on principal alone constituted but 10-15 percent
of the total number charged off reflects the expectation of the
lender that as long as charges are collected there is some pros-
pect for ultimate repayment of principal. In fact, it may be
asked why accounts on which charges are being met are
ten off at all. There are several possible explanations: perhaps
only a portion of the charges is being met each month; the
12Someof the accounts in this class are delinquent also on part of the interest
charges due.OPERATION AND COLLECTION 83
expense of attempting to collect amounts due on principal
may be excessive and refinancing inexpedient; the company
may consider it inadvisable to allow borrowers to pay charges
indefinitely, for this practice is actively opposed by state regu-
latory authorities and, if publicized, may arouse unfavorable
public sentiment.
It is rather surprising that as many as 11-24 percent of all
charged-off accounts are recorded as not being delinquent at
the time of charge-off. In a few cases this is explained by the
death of the borrower, leaving no one legally responsible for
the debt, but probably the chief explanation is that borrowers
are not nominally delinquent when they make at least some
small payment on principal in addition to charges, and the
expense of collecting even this amount may be too great to
justify continuing the account.
Table 21 provides a somewhat different statement of delin-
quency at time of charge-off, reckoning it from the time of
the last payment of charges plus at least half of the instal-
ment due on principal. By this definition average delinquency
is somewhat longer, because charge-off usually occurs a longer
time after the last payment of half or more of a principal
instalment than after a smaller fractional payment; in other
words, payments frequently begin to fall off before they cease
altogether.. Even under this definition, however, well over
two-thirds of all delinquent accounts are charged off after
7 months of delinquency or less.
It may reasonably be inferred from Tables 20 and 21 that
delinquency is expensive to the personal finance lender and
that an experienced company is reluctant to carry delinquent
accounts as assets for any extended period.
Charge-offs as an Expense of Lending
Since the inauguration of licensed lending some twenty years
ago, bad-debt losses on personal small loans have declined
substantially. Illegal lenders charged such exorbitant rates of84 PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES
interest that they could afford to lose large amounts on prin-
cipal. They could allow indefinite delinquency on principal
as long as these interest charges were paid; in fact, delin-
quency was rather to the lender's advantage than otherwise,
for the total amount of interest collected usually exceeded the
principal many times over. Licensed lenders, however, oper-
ate within narrower profit margins, and must keep bad-debt
losses correspondingly low.
It has been estimated that before the depression of 1929-33
bad-debt losses of licensed chattel lenders averaged less than
2 percent of total outstanding loans, and those of endorsed-
note lenders less than '/2 percent.'3 In the depression years
reported loss ratios rose to about 5 percent, but substantial
recoveries on charged-off accounts were subsequently made.
As has already been indicated (Table 19), in each year from
1923 through 1927 the bad-debt losses of the Household
Finance Corporation amounted to less than 1 percent of the
average investment in loans. By 1933 this proportion had
risen to a peak of over 6 percent, but recoveries subsequently
made caused repayments to exceed charge-off losses in 1936
and helped to reduce losses to 0.37 in 1937. Figures for the
American Investment Company do not show such a wide
range, but they too reflect very clearly the effects of the de-
pression years.
Though small in proportion to total outstandings, bad-debt
losses form a substantial item in the total operating expenses
of personal finance companies. One authority quotes testi-
mony, given before the Virginia Corporation Commission, to
the effect that 17.75 percent of the expenses of 52 small loan
corporations in that state arose from bad debts during the
period Data covering all states for which the figures
are available show that bad-debt losses of all reporting per-
13Robinsoñ and Nugent, op. cit., p. 197.
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sonal finance lenders averaged 10.3 percent of total expenses
in 1929, 22.7 percent in 1932, and 10.6 percent in 1936.15
It is of course true that actual bad-debt losses constitute a
small proportion of total expense compared to the costs of
preventing these losses, that is, costs of investigation and col-
lection, and therefore an index of loss provides no indication
of the general operating efficiency of a lender. But other
things being equal, one criterion of the efficiency of a given
office is the extent of its bad debts compared with the average
experience of similar offices in the business.
Repayment Record of a Sample of Loans
An especially clear picture of operating methods and collec-
tion experience in the personal finance business appears in
the repayment record of a large sample of loans extended by
the Household Finance Corporation, as presented in Table
22. The sample covers 30,951 original loans to new and
former customers and 59,379 loans to "present" borrowers
(those who substitute a present contract by a new one, either
with or without the advance of additional cash) made during
the year ending July 31, l935.'°
The prevalence of "repeat" borrowing, which has already
been mentioned, is confirmed by this sample: 58 percent of
the loans extended to new and former customers were termi-
nated by fresh loans; and for loans to present borrowers—
those who had already replaced at least one loan by another—
the percentage so terminated was even higher, 74 percent.
This indicates that repeat customers are more likely than
other borrowers to terminate the second loan by a third. More
than four out of five present customers who terminated their
15SeeTable 31, p. 110. These ratios of bad-debt losses to total expenses have
been computed by dividing the ratio of bad-debt loss to average employed
assets by the ratio of total expense to average employed assets.
16Thesefigures represent all loans made by 32 offices, distributed over the
territory served by this company. All the loan contracts included were re-
payable in 20 months, except about 8 percent for $50 or less, which were
repayable in 10 months.TABLE 22
REPAYMENT RECORD OF A SAMPLE OF LOANS MADE BY A PERSONAL FINANCE CHAIN DURING
THE YEAR ENDING JULY 31, 1935'
Age of Contract
Contracts Terminated by Contracts Terminated by Contracts Terminated by





TermznatedbPercent ofCumula- Percent ofCumula- Percent ofCumula-
Original tive Original tive Original tive





30,951 CONTRACTS MADE WITH NEW AND FORMER CUSTOMERS
I —6 14.08 14.08 25.38 25.38 .11 .11 39.57 39.57
7 —12 13.32 27.40 24.74 50.12 .44 .55 38.50 78.07
13 —18 6.04 33.44 6.69 56.81 .33 .88 13.06 91.13
19 —24 7.38 40.82 1.02 57.83 .12 1.00 8.52 99.65
59,379 NEWCONTRACTS MADE WITH PRESENT BORROWERS°
I —6 6.74 6.74 30.71 30.71 .14 .14 37.59 37.59
7 —12 6.18 12.92 33.67 64.38 .52 .66 40.37 77.96
13 —18 4.33 17.25 8.49 72.87 .36 1.02 13.18 91.14
19 —24 6.78 24.03 1.32 74.19 .17 1.19 8.27 99.41
Based on data supplied by the Household Finance Corporation, covering all loans made in 32 branch offices.
b Number of months after month of origin.
° contractsare of two kinds: those which involve the advance of additional cash, combining the obligation for the new
cash with the unpaid balance on the old loan; and those (renewals) which extend the time of payment, reduce the amount of








contracts by new loans did so within 12 months; almost half
of the new and former customers and around two—fifths of
present borrowers who repeated their borrowing did so within
6 months.
Many loans, of course, were repaid fully in cash. In the
present sample these amounted to about 40 percent of the
loans made to new and former customers, and 24 percent of
those made to present customers. Repayment of loans before
the scheduled maturity was not at all uncommon: among the
loans terminated by cash payment about two-thirds of those
to new and former customers, and about half of those to
present customers, were retired within a one-year period.17
The average contract life of the loans in this sample was 19.2
months, but at the end of 12 months some 27 percent of all
new and former borrower loans and 13 percent of all present
customer loans had been fully repaid in cash, and by the end
of 18 months over 33 percent of the former and 17 percent of
the latter had been so repaid.
It would be interesting to know how many previous loans
repeat borrowers had already received. Supplementary data
furnished by the same lender, covering 21,843 loans paid off
during 1937 and 1938 in New Jersey, where the maximum
legal contract length is shorter than the average—i 5 months
—bear on this point. Roughly one out of every three repeat
borrowers repaying their loans with cash had one previous
loan; one out of every five had two previous loans; and one
out of every two had three or more previous loans.
From these two sets of data it seems fair to conclude that
present borrowers, to whom practically two-thirds of these
sample loans were made, afford a steady source of demand
for th.e credit of personal finance lenders.
According to the sample of contracts in Table 22—originat-
ing, it is true, in a period of rising employment and industrial
'7Allowance must be made in these percentages for the fact that the sample
data include a few loans of or less which carried a 10-month, rather than
a 20-month, repayment term.4
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activity, from loan offices located in populous industrial cen-
ters—only 1 percent of the loans to new and former cus-
tomers, and a fractionally higher percent of those to present
customers, were terminated by charge-off. For both groups
the proportion of contracts terminated in this manner was
lower in the first and last six months of the contract life than
in the intervening periods. The outstanding fact regarding
collection experience, however, is that under careful loan ad-
ministration the proportion of personal loans charged off is
extremely small for all classes of borrowers and for all lengths
of contract. The ultimate credit control problem of the per-
sonal loan company is to keep this crucial percentage low.